Hoskinson Explains Hash vs Lattice-Based Cryptography

Charles Hoskinson highlights the gap between hash functions and lattice-based cryptography

Cardano founder Charles Hoskinson drew attention to a common point of confusion in security discussions: the difference between cryptographic hash functions and other tools that may look “hash-like” but do not meet the same security requirements.

The distinction matters because not every function that compresses data is suitable for cryptography. In the material referenced alongside Hoskinson’s comments, checksum algorithms such as CRC-32 and other cyclic redundancy checks are cited as examples of mechanisms designed for error detection under weaker assumptions, and therefore generally unsuitable as cryptographic hashes.

Cryptographic hash functions are expected to satisfy additional properties beyond producing a short output from an input. Those properties typically include resistance to collisions and preimage attacks, which are central to how blockchains and many security systems ensure integrity and tamper-resistance. Linear functions and checksum-style constructions, while useful in networking and storage, are not designed to provide those guarantees.

The conversation also touched on lattice-based cryptography, a major family of approaches being pursued for “post-quantum” security—systems intended to remain secure even if large-scale quantum computers become practical. Lattice-based schemes rely on the assumption that certain computational problems on lattices (including ideal lattices) are difficult to solve efficiently.

As part of the broader context, the referenced material notes that two lattice-based algorithms—CRYSTALS-Kyber and CRYSTALS-Dilithium—were among the first post-quantum algorithms standardized by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Kyber is used for key establishment, while Dilithium is used for digital signatures, reflecting two of the foundational building blocks of modern cryptographic systems.

The discussion also situates lattice-based methods alongside other post-quantum approaches, including multivariate cryptography. One example mentioned is Rainbow (an “Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar” scheme), which is based on the difficulty of solving systems of multivariate equations.

Overall, the key takeaway is a practical one: when evaluating security claims—whether in blockchain infrastructure or post-quantum readiness—terminology matters. A checksum is not a cryptographic hash, and “hard math problems” can come from different families of assumptions, such as lattices or multivariate equations, each with distinct design goals and security considerations.