Optimizely Breach Swapped Wallet Addresses Across Major Sites

A compromise involving Optimizely’s website experimentation service placed malicious JavaScript on customer projects connected to 178 organizations, including Ledger, BBC, CNN, Zoom, HSBC and IKEA. The code could replace a crypto wallet address displayed to a visitor with an attacker’s address, turning a routine transfer into a potential theft.
Decrypt reported that the campaign also skimmed cards and that the attacker’s wallets received about $7,150 in crypto before they were emptied early Tuesday. CoinDesk reported that Optimizely identified an exploited vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow and said it had blocked the route, removed the malicious payload and fixed the flaw.
What happened
Report URI examined 1,611 Optimizely scripts and found malicious code in 188 scripts tied to 178 organizations, according to Decrypt. The named organizations spanned sectors including media, enterprise technology, financial services, retail and consumer electronics.
Among the organizations identified by Decrypt were hardware wallet maker Ledger, Zoom, BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA and HSBC. The scope reflects the risk created when a common web service is embedded across many separate sites and projects.
The injected code first appeared early on November 16 UTC, Decrypt reported. By late that evening, Report URI could no longer find the code in the scripts it had reviewed, while researchers had urged visitors on November 16 to check crypto transfers.
CoinDesk said an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely’s Experimentation account signup flow on November 16. According to CoinDesk, the attacker used that access to insert rogue code into customer projects before Optimizely blocked the affected path and removed the payload.
The script searched pages for wallet addresses on Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, Tron and five other networks, CoinDesk reported. It then replaced those addresses with attacker-controlled addresses in form fields and clipboard text, meaning a transfer approved after copying the altered destination could send funds to the attacker.
Decrypt put the crypto received by the attacker’s wallets at about $7,150, mostly in Bitcoin, Litecoin and USDT. Reporting on the proceeds is not fully aligned, with conflict notes citing about $7,040 from CoinDesk and FinanceFeeds for the same incident.
Why it matters
The incident targeted a point in the transaction process that sits outside a wallet’s private-key storage. A hardware wallet or other signing device can protect keys, but it cannot by itself ensure that an address copied from an infected webpage belongs to the intended recipient.
For crypto transfers, the destination address is a critical instruction. The malicious script described by CoinDesk focused on what visitors saw in a form field or received through copied clipboard text. That made the website interface, rather than the crypto network itself, the place where the address could be changed.
The presence of Ledger among the named organizations gives the episode particular relevance for wallet users, although Decrypt’s reporting identified a far broader group of affected organizations. The incident was not limited to a single crypto-focused website, nor was the underlying mechanism limited to one blockchain.
Card skimming also widened the potential impact beyond digital-asset transfers, according to Decrypt. A single malicious web script could therefore affect different forms of payment or sensitive information depending on the page and the action taken by a visitor.
Background and context
This was a supply-chain compromise because affected websites automatically pulled Optimizely code from Optimizely’s trusted servers. Their own servers did not need to be breached for the malicious code to reach visitors.
That distinction is important. Organizations may use third-party services to run website experiments, and the code from those services can load directly into pages viewed by the public. When a shared provider is compromised, the impact can extend across separate organizations that use the same service.
For crypto users, address-swapping malware presents a distinct problem. Careful storage of private keys may reduce one set of risks, but it does not prevent a copied destination address from being changed while an infected page is open. If a user then approves the transfer to that altered address, the transaction can go to the attacker.
Optimizely said in a Monday evening status update that an unauthorized party had exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation product to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects, according to Decrypt. That statement links the issue to the platform’s experimentation service rather than to a direct compromise of each named organization’s infrastructure.
What to watch
Further details may clarify which customer projects received the malicious code and whether every organization identified in the script review had visitors exposed to the same functionality. The available reporting identifies 188 malicious scripts associated with 178 organizations, but it does not establish the number of affected visitors or transactions.
Another question is whether organizations provide notices describing their own exposure reviews, including any assessment of card-skimming activity. Decrypt reported that malicious code had been removed from the scripts Report URI could find by late on November 16, while CoinDesk reported that Optimizely removed the payload and fixed the vulnerability.
The differing reported amounts associated with the attacker’s wallets also remain relevant. Decrypt reported about $7,150, while conflict notes cite about $7,040 from CoinDesk and FinanceFeeds. Additional wallet analysis could explain the difference between those figures.
It will also be important to follow any further technical information on the affected networks, the use of form fields and clipboard replacement, and the remediation steps taken by Optimizely and the organizations whose projects were involved.
